Can Reasons Be Irreducibly Relational?
Abstract
Abstract The irreducibility thesis is the view that there are some reasons for action whose normative force is not explained by the value of the actions for which they are reasons, but which must instead be explained in terms of some relation between agents. This view has been developed influentially by Stephen Darwall, Margaret Gilbert, and R. Jay Wallace. In this article, I argue that the normative force of any reason must be explained by the value of the action for which it is a reason, and so that the irreducibility thesis is false.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Pages
- 1–11
- Publication date
- 3 September 2026
- Language
- EN