Resisting relegation to the rank and file: Explaining the effects of status seeking on military force structure

Abstract States can acquire international status through battlefield performance, but they can also pursue it through the fielding of ostentatious prestige platforms that look impressive but, unless properly supported, possess limited battlefield utility. When and how do status concerns influence states’ military force structure choices? This article advances a choice-theoretic model of states’ military force structure choices as a function of external threat and the ease of acquiring status. When threats are high, countries uniformly pursue military effectiveness. But when external threats are low and conditions for status enhancement are propitious due to states confronting a destabilised status hierarchy or enjoying a surfeit of resources, military effectiveness is sacrificed in favour of prestige platforms unsupported by requisite enablers. A paired case study leveraging original archival documents traces the evolution of British and American naval procurement practices in the early twentieth century to illustrate the argument.