Backsliding in a Landslide: How EU’s Fiscal Distributions Empower Corrupt Governments

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Authors: Albana Shehaj
Cited by: 0
References: 23

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Abstract

Abstract How do European Union (EU) fiscal allocations affect the electoral performance of corrupt incumbent governments? While existing research links EU funds to governance quality and corruption, less is known about how these resources interact with domestic political incentives to shape electoral outcomes. This article advances a theory of corruption compensation , arguing that EU transfers provide politically vulnerable incumbents with discretionary resources that can be redirected to consolidate electoral support. Using data on EU fiscal allocations and electoral outcomes in twenty-six member states between 2000 and 2015, the analysis shows that higher levels of EU funding are associated with larger electoral margins for governing parties in countries with high executive corruption. These effects are absent in less corrupt contexts. The findings suggest that, under weak domestic accountability and limited enforcement, EU fiscal instruments unintentionally reinforce illiberal governance and weaken the regulatory objectives of cohesion policy. The article highlights the need to integrate political risk considerations more systematically into the design and implementation of EU spending conditionality.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Corruption and Economic Development Regional Development and Policy European Union Policy and Governance

Publication details

Journal / source
European Journal of Risk Regulation
Pages
1–20
Publication date
26 March 2026
Language
EN