Between Passions and Pseudo-Passions: Thomas Aquinas on Shame

Abstract In this paper, I argue that shame ( verecundia ) functions as a key passion, revealing the complex structure of human affectivity and shedding new light on the understanding of Aquinas’s theory of the passions. In numerous passions, such as sadness, fear, or pleasure, the appetitive motion and the accompanying bodily changes follow the same direction – expansion or contraction – according to a common sensory basis. In contrast, shame presents a clear exception: while the appetite contracts inward, vital spirit and heat expand outward, producing blushing. According to Aquinas, passions are motions of the sensitive appetite accompanied by bodily change. Although shame retains this structure, its change is nevertheless formed through the redundantia of the higher faculties, which leads me to argue that it occupies an intermediate position between ‘passions properly speaking’ and ‘purely intellectual pseudo-passions’. By analyzing shame in this light, I demonstrate that human passions should be understood not as purely natural or rational, but as complex intersections of both.