Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment
Abstract
Abstract The literature on theoretical equivalence in the philosophy of physics is replete with physical theories that look quite different but are purportedly equivalent. Plausibly, there might exist a pair of equivalent theories that look different insofar as they existentially quantify over different entities. However, given the preeminence of the quantificational theory of ontological commitment, which tells us to look to quantified entities to inform ontology, such a pair of theories seems to be a problem. In this article, I argue that there is no good way out of the problem, and I reject the quantificational theory of ontological commitment.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy
Science
and History
Philosophy and History of Science
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Philosophy of Science
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 521–540
- Publication date
- 13 January 2026
- Language
- EN