Unreasonable Doubt. How Strategic Science Skeptics Exploit the Argument from Disagreement
Abstract
Abstract Strategic science skeptics criticize scientific claims solely to promote non-epistemic goals. I will analyze and debunk a philosophically neglected argument exploited by strategic science skeptics: the argument from disagreement. The core of this argument is that one should lower one’s confidence in a scientific claim when having learned that there is a scientific disagreement about this claim. I will develop a (Bayesian) Justificatory Account of Multiple Testimony to provide a normative characterization of how learning about agreements and disagreements is connected to confirming and disconfirming scientific claims. I will use this account to debunk the argument from disagreement.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and History of Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 675–695
- Publication date
- 21 January 2026
- Language
- EN