Responsibility and the Special Question ‘Why?’
Abstract
Abstract Anscombe defined intentional action in terms of what she called ‘the special question “Why?”’ In the first part of this article, we present four objections to defining intentional action in this way. Then, in the second part, we show that Anscombe’s special question can instead be used to define a much broader category of conduct, namely that for which an agent is responsible. We thereby repurpose one of the most influential ideas in twentieth-century philosophy of action within a novel theory of responsibility.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Free Will and Agency
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 131–158
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Language
- EN