An evaluative ontological argument
Abstract
Abstract I present a new ontological argument that rests on two evaluative theses, both inspired by Anselm’s Proslogion 2. First, for any F and Q, it is no better for there to be an F, given Q, than it is for there to be something perfect. Second, it is better for there to be something perfect if there is such a thing than if there isn’t. It follows that there is something perfect. I examine these premises, consider some parodies, and suggest possible atheistic replies.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Study and Philosophy of Religion
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Karl Barth and Christian Theology
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Religious Studies
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 883–901
- Publication date
- 26 February 2026
- Language
- EN