Why I am not a biological naturalist

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026

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Authors: Leonard Dung
DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103440
Cited by: 0
References: 15

Abstract

I make three claims: First, denying biological naturalism does not logically require computational functionalism. Second, while Seth's arguments establish biological naturalism as a view worth taking seriously, they fail to make it more plausible than the view that AI can be conscious. Third, there are independent arguments suggesting the overall more plausible view is that AI can be conscious.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Embodied and Extended Cognition Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy and History of Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Volume
49
Pages
e331–e331
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN