Good Company: Economic Policy after Shareholder Primacy. By Lenore Palladino. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2024. 184p.

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Authors: Katharine Jackson
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Abstract

At first glance, Good Company looks like a policy manual and a political rhetoric. As a policy manual, it provides advice for Biden-era staffers committed to "producerism," a nostalgic industrial strategy envisioning an active role for the federal government in rehabilitating, growing, and reshaping a national economy. As a rhetorical tactic, it clarifies for a public audience both the danger and artificiality of our ideological and legal commitments to shareholder value. Rather than retain corporate earnings to build more factories and hire more workers, corporate directors spend corporate money to buy back shares from the public market, manipulating prices while getting rich themselves. Couched in terms of utilitarian productivity rather than social or labor rights, the argument should prove appealing to a broad audience with diverse normative commitments.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Corporate Finance and Governance Housing Finance and Neoliberalism Political Economy and Marxism

Publication details

Journal / source
Perspectives on Politics
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
443–445
Publication date
1 March 2026
Language
EN