Experimental asymmetric relativistic zero-knowledge proofs with unconditional security

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Authors: Chen-Xun Weng, Mingyang Li, Naitao Xu, Yanglin Hu, Ian M. George, Jiawei Wu, Shengjun Wu, Hua‐Lei Yin, Zeng‐Bing Chen
Cited by: 0
References: 52

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are widely applied in digital economies, such as cryptocurrencies and smart contracts, for establishing trust and privacy between untrusted parties. Classical ZKPs rely on computational assumptions and are vulnerable to quantum attacks. While a recent advance suggests quantum-sound symmetric relativistic ZKPs for the graph three-coloring problem without computational assumptions, the high round complexity, which leads to unachievable runtime and overall randomness cost, renders them impractical for real-life deployment. To overcome this, we develop an efficient asymmetric relativistic ZKP protocol using relativistic bit commitments, and prove its quantum soundness by relating it to the nonlocal Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game. Our protocol achieves a linear relationship between the round complexity and the number of edges, and thus significantly improves practical feasibility. In addition, we implement a proof-of-principle experiment which completes all interactive rounds in about 0.22 seconds and requires an overall randomness cost of 430.81 MB. Our work illustrates the powerful potential of integrating special relativity with quantum theory in trustless cryptography, paving the way for robust applications against quantum attacks in distrustful Internet environments. Zero-knowledge proofs can protect privacy online, but almost all current methods are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Here, the authors report an efficient relativistic protocol and experiment that resists quantum attacks and greatly reduces runtime, randomness cost and communication rounds.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptography and Data Security Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic Cryptographic Implementations and Security

Publication details

Journal / source
Nature Communications
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Volume
17
Issue
1
Publication date
26 May 2026
Language
EN