Remanufacturing authorization and blockchain platform joining strategies for a competitive supply chain

Authorized remanufacturing has become a potential strategy for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) facing competition from third-party remanufacturers (TPRs). However, the lack of transparency in the remanufacturing process reduces consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for remanufactured products. Blockchain technology, with its traceability and tamper-proof features, enhances the transparency of remanufacturing, thereby increasing consumers’ WTP for remanufactured products. Yet, the use of blockchain may also raise concerns about privacy leakage among consumers. Based on this, this paper constructs a supply chain game-theoretic model involving an OEM, a TPR, and a retailer to investigate the interplay between remanufacturing authorization strategies and blockchain adoption strategies. Four game-theoretic models are established, considering whether the TPR joins the retailer’s blockchain platform and which authorization mode is selected. The results show that the OEM’s choice of remanufacturing authorization strategy is jointly influenced by the cost advantage of remanufacturing, the fixed authorization fee, and the cost of blockchain adoption. For the TPR, joining the retailer’s blockchain platform is beneficial under both authorization strategies when the unit variable cost of blockchain adoption and consumers’ privacy concerns are low.