Policy synergies and market dynamics in green vehicle adoption: a game-theoretic framework with heterogeneous consumer preferences

Abstract The dual-credit policy targeting automobile manufacturers and the subsidy policy for charging infrastructure operators have become pivotal mechanisms guiding and promoting the development of the automotive industry. Addressing the limited discussion in existing research on the synergistic effects of dual-credit policies and charging infrastructure subsidies, this study constructs a three-stage dynamic game model to analyze the decision-making behaviors of the government, enterprises, and consumers, and examines the direct and cross-effects of policies and consumer preferences. The findings indicate that the dual-credit policy and charging infrastructure subsidy policy have a positive synergistic effect on the development of electric vehicles. Tightening the dual-credit policy prompts the government to increase the intensity of subsidies for charging infrastructure. Combined policies exert a stronger incentive effect on charging infrastructure operators compared to electric vehicle manufacturers. Furthermore, as consumer preferences for green vehicles strengthen, the demand for electric vehicles rises, prompting the government to enhance subsidy intensity for charging infrastructure, which ultimately leads to increased social welfare.