Policy synergy in green transition: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis of pollution and carbon mitigation through command, market, and voluntary interventions

Promoting the synergy of pollution reduction and carbon mitigation is a crucial strategy for China’s current climate and environmental governance. This requires active policy measures from both the production and consumption sides. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises, and consumers, while considering the effects of green transformation on pollution reduction and carbon mitigation. It explores the impact of the coordinated implementation of command-control, market-incentive, and voluntary policies on promoting green production and consumption. The key findings are as follows: 1) The decisions of the government, enterprises, and consumers are interrelated. To drive the system toward the optimal equilibrium state of green production and consumption, breaking the initial path dependence is crucial. The government must enhance regulatory intensity in the early stages and strengthen publicity and education for enterprises and the public, thereby effectively elevating the initial participation willingness of all three parties. 2) Policy implementation should be tailored to industrial heterogeneity. For industries with substantial abatement potential and high emission intensity, market policies are most effective; these sectors should be prioritized for inclusion in the carbon trading market with differentiated quota schemes. Conversely, for industries with lower emission bases and limited abatement potential, low-cost administrative controls or direct environmental taxes are more suitable. 3) The substitution relationship among policies requires dynamic alignment with market and technological maturity, yet a diversified policy mix remains indispensable. When abatement efficiency and carbon prices are sufficiently high, market-based tools can lower compliance costs through streamlined processes, such as replacing environmental taxes with a single carbon trading mechanism. However, voluntary interventions on the consumption side cannot be substituted by market regulation or mandatory supervision.