CEO human capital and corporate financialization: generalist versus specialist CEOs

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Authors: Xin Sui, Guocai Chen
Cited by: 0
References: 47

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Abstract

This study examines how CEOs’ human capital affects corporate financialization. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms comprising 43,010 firm-year observations, we employ the fixed effect model and find that firms led by generalist CEOs are more likely to engage in corporate financialization. Mechanism analyses reveal that generalist CEOs are less sensitive to core business performance and more sensitive to financial investment performance. Moreover, outside options and the internal pay gap are identified as two critical factors explaining the divergence in financialization between specialist and generalist CEOs. The heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of generalist CEOs on financialization is more pronounced for firms with younger CEOs, non-state-owned firms, firms with lower institutional ownership, and firms with less media coverage. Finally, we confirm that financialization driven by generalist CEOs crowds out real investment, thereby harming firm value.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Corporate Finance and Governance Housing Finance and Neoliberalism Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Publication details

Journal / source
Applied Economics
Pages
1–16
Publication date
1 April 2026
Language
EN