Robustness and the Distinctive Properties of Epistemic Ideals
Summary
No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.
Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.Abstract
Why care about ideal epistemic norms? Why not merely care about norms that agents like us can actually meet? In this paper, I make two claims. First, I argue that, if we want robust epistemic norms, we can’t just do idealised epistemology. We need to confirm that the results and observations that are central in idealised epistemology also obtain in other contexts. Second, I argue that, if we really want to capture the fundamental nature of epistemic normativity, we need the sort of frameworks that come from non-ideal epistemology. I develop this argument in response to ideas put forward by Jennifer Carr (2022) surrounding the distinctive properties of epistemic ideals.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Pages
- 1–18
- Publication date
- 30 March 2026
- Language
- EN