Internalism without cartesianism privilege

Contemporary philosophy has seen a widespread rejection of Cartesianism, roughly, the thesis that we always know our own minds [Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. A number of philosophers, notably [Wedgwood. 2002. “Internalism Explained.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 349–369], [Srinivasan, A. 2015. “Normativity without Cartesian privilege.” Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 273–299], [Weatherson, B. 2019. Normative externalism. Oxford University Press] and [Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2019. “Guidance, epistemic filters, and non-accidental ought-doing.” Philosophical Issues 29: 172–183], have argued that anti-Cartesianism undermines the main argument for normative internalism, the thesis that what we ought to do depends on our internal mental states. I will defend a novel version of normative internalism which is well-motivated despite the rejection of Cartesianism. I will argue that this version of internalism has important advantages over externalism, showing how normative internalism can survive the absence of Cartesian privilege.