Revisiting epistemic sensitivity and evidence

One influential approach to distinguishing individual evidence from statistical evidence in legal epistemology is the sensitivity account, proposed by Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3): 197–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12000). More recently, Günther (2024. “Epistemic Sensitivity and Evidence.” Inquiry 67 (6): 1348–1366. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1936158) has advanced a revised version – the epistemic sensitivity account – claimed to improve upon Enoch et al.’s original proposal. In particular, it is argued that the account not only distinguishes between statistical and individual evidence, but also, unlike Enoch et al.’s account, accommodates the possibility of acceptable erroneous verdicts. In this paper, I present three objections against epistemic sensitivity and conclude that it fails on both counts.