More paradoxical Moore-paradoxical sentences

‘Moore’s Paradox’ concerns sentences like ‘it’s raining and I don’t believe that it’s raining’. Philosophers have attempted to explain why asserting them, or believing their contents, would be absurd. Why are they paradoxical? The common story is that unlike contradictory sentences, Moore-paradoxical sentences could be true or might be true, so it is puzzling why they cannot be appropriately asserted or their contents rationally believed. However, it is not at all paradoxical that a particular sentence that’s merely possibly true – perhaps true only at distant worlds – cannot be so asserted or believed. Nor is this paradoxical even for a sentence that is merely epistemically possible, or merely true at nearby worlds. It is paradoxical that there are (actually) true sentences like this, which one cannot learn, and one can do much to pinpoint them oneself. I show how ubiquitous and easily identifiable are true Moore-paradoxical sentences, thus sharpening the paradox.