Governing Asymmetric Interdependence Networks: How Network Position and Institutional Power Shape US Hypersecuritization and Japanese Strategic Desecuritization of Submarine Cable Policies

Submarine cables are digital infrastructure and network technology that underpin global data flows, yet their governance is increasingly shaped by security competition. However, existing scholarship often treats network structures as static, overlooking how the unique techno-industrial characteristics of subsea cables transform into acute security threats. Drawing on a framework that integrates weaponized interdependence with securitization theory, this article investigates why the United States and Japan pursue fundamentally divergent securitization strategies despite being close allies facing identical techno-industrial dependencis on the Chinese industry. A mixed-method analysis, combining Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) indicators (2019–2023) with systematic process tracing, first identifies that the sector′s unique attributes generate shared threat clusters, ranging from supply chain fragility and geographic concentration to adversary control and erosion of data sovereignty, that map onto weaponized interdependence mechanisms. However, national responses diverge. The United States, leveraging its hub position and externally oriented institutional power, advances hypersecuritization through institutional lock-in and exclusionary mandates that extend asymmetric network control. Conversely, Japan, constrained by its spoke position and domestic imperatives for technology-driven connectivity, adopts strategic desecuritization by embedding protective measures whithin civilian economic governance, such as resilience building and industrial subsidies. These findings conceptualize securitization not as a binary outcome but as a spectrum of institutional practice shaped by the interaction of technological materiality, network position, and institutional power.