Making Sense of Science Denialism

Many well educated and apparently rational people claim that vaccines are bad, that the Earth is flat and that human activity is not globally warming the planet, while knowing very well the scientific consensus on these issues. Such science denialism might seem very puzzling. In this article, I argue that many attempts to make sense of it fail, most notably because they confuse or identify denialism with conspiracy theories. Unlike conspiracy theories, I will argue, denialism is exoteric and intuitive; it often expresses a form of epistemic populism triggered by the hypercomplex and counterintuitive character of science and its correlative exclusion of laymen. Understood this way, denialism turns out not only to be ‘normally rational’, it is also positively reasonable in the sense that it is justified by reasons that are not generally decisive, of course, but whose rejection requires in-depth philosophical reflection. Indeed, it can be justified by appealing to ‘democratic’ epistemic values such as epistemic autonomy and what Harding (2005) calls strong objectivity, and by rejecting certain epistemic values that may legitimately appear problematic, such as the epistemic deference to authorities and the objectivity, perhaps not inclusive enough, of our sciences.