Between agent and governor: local officials’ selective implementation of religious policies in China

Under the "decentralized" or "fragmented" authoritarian governing structure, China's local officials have long enjoyed leeway in implementing central policies in their areas of jurisdiction. Specifically in the religious policy realm, local officials have been selective in how and upon whom to implement repressive policies. How do we explain the local officials' selective implementation of religious policies? I argue that officials' selective repression varies with Party priorities and local relationships. Specifically, the center's priorities communicated to local officials determine the officials' style of repression, and combined with the officials' view of the church then determine the target of repression. The applicability of the explanation is borne out through 120 interviews with Chinese religious leaders and officials. The research reveals that the ways in which religious policies have been, and are currently being, implemented at the local level have important implications for Chinese domestic policymaking as well as the society at large.