Autism through the notion of a form of life: A critical review

This paper critically reviews prominent Wittgensteinian approaches to autism based on the notion of a “form of life.” While all of these approaches offer a powerful alternative to dominant cognitivist views, their specific accounts of autism differ significantly. These contrasting accounts stem not only from different interpretations of what a form of life encompasses but also from related theoretical commitments. The paper begins by analyzing Peter Hobson’s view of a given, universal form of life, and argues that it disregards the role of social practices in the exclusion of autistic people. It then addresses Ian Hacking’s approach, examining how his pluralistic view allows precisely for an inclusive, shared form of life. Next, the paper examines Robert Chapman’s claim that autism is a distinct form of life. It argues that this view is problematically “internalist,” and suggests an alternative way to articulate its main insights. Finally, the paper addresses Victoria McGeer’s “regulative view of folk-psychology” – akin to the “form of life hypothesis” – as a double-edged sword: it can either reinforce deficit models or, alternatively, illuminate the profound harm caused by ill-fitting social norms. Ultimately, this paper champions views that actively promote the diversity of the human form of life.