Neurodiversity & evaluation: a defense (or not) of affective fictionalism

This paper explores the intersection between affective fictionalism and the neurodiversity movement, which advocates for the recognition of cognitive differences (e.g. autism, ADHD) as natural variations that, although potentially disabling, are not inner deficits. We argue that affective fictionalism, which views mental state attributions as normative evaluations rather than fact-stating claims, is well positioned to accommodate three desiderata that the neurodiversity paradigm imposes on any theory of folk psychology: (1) acknowledging a diversity of cognitive styles, (2) recognizing the openness to social change of mental attribution, and (3) mitigating different contributory and epistemic injustices faced by neurodivergent individuals. By analyzing disagreements and resistance within neurodiversity activism, we defend that affective fictionalism captures the evaluative nature of mental ascriptions and their role in shaping social dynamics.