Reasons that are not reasons: A Hackingian genealogy of paranoia and its social significance

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Authors: Dylan Guével
Cited by: 0
References: 29

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Abstract

This article draws on Ian Hacking’s notion of historical ontology to address ongoing controversies surrounding the concept of paranoia and its use beyond the boundaries of psychiatry. By tracing the genealogy of paranoia back to early nineteenth-century French psychiatry and the problem of monomania, the paper argues that paranoia has never been a purely clinical concept. From its inception, psychiatric descriptions of paranoia incorporated judicial, moral, and political concerns alongside medical observation. Nineteenth-century psychiatrists were confronted with individuals who appeared rational and socially competent yet were regarded as mad. They claimed specific expertise in identifying such cases. The concept of paranoia thus came to designate forms of reasoning that appear coherent but are nonetheless regarded as the mechanical product of a pathology: reasons that are not genuine reasons. I argue that this conception carries an irreducible moral and political significance, as it underwrites psychiatrists’ claims to authority in legal and public contexts. The social and political dimensions of paranoia, therefore, were not later additions to an originally medical concept, but part of its original meaning.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Mental Health and Psychiatry Historical Psychiatry and Medical Practices Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology

Publication details

Journal / source
Philosophical Psychology
Pages
1–17
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN