Legitimacy, power, and the politics of security in localized counterinsurgency: lessons from India, Iraq, and beyond

This article examines how political context shapes the effectiveness and durability of localized counterinsurgency forces through a comparative study of India’s District Reserve Guard (DRG) and Iraq’s Sons of Iraq (SoI). Drawing on the frameworks of Kalyvas, Kilcullen, and Staniland, it argues that the success of localized counterinsurgency depends less on battlefield performance than on the political and institutional embedding of local forces within state structures. The DRG’s incorporation into the formal security apparatus and its grounding in local governance networks have produced operational continuity and legitimacy. In contrast, the SoI’s external sponsorship and weak linkage to the Iraqi state generated temporary stability but long-term fragility after the withdrawal of U.S. support. By situating these cases within broader debates on the state’s governance of violence, the article advances understanding of how legitimacy, institutional integration, and political will determine the sustainability of localized security initiatives in fragmented internal conflicts.