Authoritarian Public Opinion, Vividness, and International Crisis Signaling

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Authors: Andrew Chubb
Cited by: 1

Abstract

How can public opinion in an authoritarian state deter or compel adversaries? Existing theories based on rationalist bargaining frameworks suggest that authoritarian domestic audiences are likely to influence bargaining only when leaders are either politically vulnerable or willing to accept the risks of allowing nationalist street protests. This article offers a broader theory of how authoritarian public opinion shapes international crises. Vivid outpourings of mass hostility and anger amplify and draw foreign observers’ attention to coercive threats, while the state’s visible management of public outrage conveys necessary assurances of threat conditionality. A detailed reconstruction of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis demonstrates how a wave of online nationalism helped China deter Philippine resistance to its seizure of a key South China Sea feature.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Public Relations and Crisis Communication Misinformation and Its Impacts Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

Publication details

Journal / source
Security Studies
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Volume
35
Issue
2
Pages
376–408
Publication date
15 March 2026
Language
EN