Disinformation, security politics, and legislative outcomes in Africa

Why do some legislative efforts to securitise disinformation succeed while others fail? This paper addresses this question through a comparative analysis of Kenya and Nigeria, two hybrid regimes that introduced laws to criminalise disinformation but experienced sharply different outcomes. Drawing on securitisation theory, it argues that outcomes hinge on effective discursive framing and executive-legislature alignment. In Kenya, securitising actors invoked historical trauma, moral urgency, and national security concerns to justify the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act. In Nigeria, the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill failed amid vague framing, strong civic opposition, and a public trust deficit. The paper offers a relational and context-sensitive account of how digital threats are framed, contested, and legislated. The findings demonstrate that securitisation depends on how threats are constructed and negotiated across political and societal arenas. In doing so, the paper contributes to ongoing debates on the politics of platform governance in Africa.