Tribalism, institutions, and insecurity in the EAC: Tanzania’s nation-building and the M23 rebellion in the DRC

Political instrumentalisation of ethnic identity remains a principal driver of insecurity in the East African Community. This article compares Tanzania’s nation-building trajectory with the persistence of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), exemplified by the M23 rebellion. Using qualitative comparative-historical analysis and process tracing, it draws on secondary scholarship, archival sources, and triangulated datasets (ACLED, UNHCR, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators). We combine social identity theory and ethnic conflict theory to examine how institutional design and implementation shape incentives for ethnic mobilisation and state resilience. Three mechanisms help explain Tanzania’s relative cohesion: a nationally integrating Kiswahili language policy; legal regulation of political parties that limits ethnic outbidding; and subnational governance arrangements that reinforce civic nationalism. In the DRC, partial and uneven adoption of comparable reforms – amid insecurity and weak administrative capacity – has enabled politicised identity claims to be converted into armed entrepreneurship and rebellion. The analysis shows that ethnic diversity alone does not predict insecurity; instead, institutional incentives, state capacity, and implementation conditions determine whether identity-based grievances escalate into organised violence. The article concludes with policy implications for fragile, resource-rich states pursuing sustainable peacebuilding and regional stability in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 across the wider region.