What Minilateralism Can and Can’t Do in Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict Management

What can – and can’t – minilateralism contribute to the management of cross-Taiwan Strait conflict? Although US-linked minilateral mechanisms have multiplied across the Indo–Pacific, their concrete relevance to Taiwan’s security has not been systematically assessed. To address this gap, the study develops a comparative framework focused on policy signalling, deterrence by punishment and by denial, and escalation dynamics, and applies it to three prominent cases: the US–Japan–South Korea trilateral, the Quad, and TSD. The analysis finds that these minilaterals generate distinct and uneven security effects. The US–Japan–South Korea trilateral provides the strongest signalling and denial leverage due to institutionalised intelligence-sharing and operational coordination. Across all mechanisms, escalation risks persist and domestic political constraints hinder consistent implementation. The article clarifies the mechanisms through which minilateralism shapes China’s cost–benefit calculus, and delineates the boundaries of what minilateral settings can realistically achieve. Minilateralism cannot substitute for Taiwan’s self-defence, but it meaningfully shapes China’s cost–benefit calculus by raising uncertainty, reducing vulnerabilities, and reinforcing a more resilient Indo–Pacific security environment.