Experimental economics in the control of quadruple helix projects in local innovation systems in Colombia

This paper investigates the effects of administrative, scientific, prestige, incentive, and other control mechanisms on the behaviour of quadruple helix (4H) project managers. Drawing on concepts from experimental economics and game theory, a framed experiment was designed in which 530 subjects from four local innovation systems in Valle del Cauca, Colombia, participated. These participants were required to decide whether to comply with or disregard assigned tasks. The findings indicate that managers do not perceive the strength of the prisoner’s dilemma and instead operate according to the logic of the stag hunt game, thus settling into a security-based equilibrium that enables only incremental innovation. This approach ensures receipt of the expected salary and preserves their prestige, thereby explaining the limited impact of science projects in the region. The study concludes that a credible institutional framework is needed to make scientific evaluation effective, enhance prestige, and encourage researchers to pursue radical innovation so that science and technology can truly serve as drivers of development in middle- and low-income economies.