Locked-in: the early modern family as an institutional solution

This contribution uses the lens of institutional economics to analyze early modern families with a particular focus on families in the Dutch Republic. Departing from the assumption that institutions (such as families) exist because they are an efficient solution to a problem (i.e., the Coase theorem), this essay argues that families existed, at least in part, to solve the problem of preserving and distributing intergenerational social capital. In this contribution, we introduce the concept of ‘familial capital’ as a distinct form of capital that encompasses both social (e.g. status) and economic (e.g. land) types of capital, characterized by the family’s ability to transfer such capital intergenerationally. We specifically investigate familial capital’s social elements of reputation and status. Through a set of case studies based on ego-documents and notarial deeds from the early modern Dutch Republic, we aim to show how the family functions as a particularly effective institution for ‘locking in’ familial capital. Although our findings are based on sources pertaining to affluent elites, existing scholarship suggests that these mechanisms existed across lower socio-economic strata as well. Because families were able to permanently lock in this familial capital, families solved a social problem in a more efficient way than corporate or contracted alternatives could.