Policy Design and Institutional Change for Corruption Control: Recent Insights from OECD Countries

This contribution to the debate on anti-corruption public policies suggests it is necessary to separate public integrity and public accountability in order to understand their effects on corruption control. The core argument is that improving corruption control depends on achieving a high level of both public integrity and public accountability. Yet there is no causal mechanism linking these conditions: public integrity does not depend on public accountability, and vice-versa. They are but two separate dimensions of a single explanation. The research is grounded in set theory and unfolds a configurational analysis of two sets of conditions—public accountability and public integrity—for high corruption control perceptions. A qualitative comparative analysis is conducted across the 38 OECD member countries, which have been selected for their long-lasting commitment with anti-bribery and public integrity strategies. The findings indicate that public integrity is neither necessary nor sufficient for corruption control, unlike public accountability. This contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between policy design and institutional change in democratic governance.