Contract institutions as a weak source of comparative advantage

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Authors: Fei Chen, Wenbin Wang, Yongjin Wang, Jian Zhang
Cited by: 0
References: 10

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Abstract

Is a country’s ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? This paper revisits the question and shows that the relationship breaks down in countries with weak contract enforcement. We then develop a model that incorporates firms’ endogenous technology choices regarding standardization and customized inputs, and find that cross-country heterogeneity in industry standardization and supplier distributions can generate contract intensity reversals, making industry measures based on a single country unreliable.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Law Economics and Judicial Systems Global trade and economics Global Trade and Competitiveness

Publication details

Journal / source
Applied Economics Letters
Pages
1–4
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN