Why resistance fails: unpopular legislative autocratization and opposition weakness in Peru

Why has resistance to autocratization failed in Peru despite widespread opposition and the ruling coalition’s internal weaknesses? Existing research on resistance to autocratization often focuses on cases of successful democratic pushback, overlooking instances where resistance collapses despite seemingly favourable conditions or how it varies across different autocratization paths, particularly the combined minoritarian-continuist and legislative-led types. This article examines Peru’s case, where democratic erosion has been driven not by a popular, anti-elitist executive leader but by a deeply unpopular, status quo-oriented congressional coalition. I argue resistance faltered due to the combination of three factors: (1) legislative institutional capture, severely weakening institutional checks; (2) weakness and divisions of both political and social opposition, limiting effective challenge; and (3) a permissive international context characterized by weakened democratic pressure and absent enforcement mechanisms, which failed to constrain the ruling coalition as it had in previous crises. Employing a mixed-methods approach, this study integrates quantitative data from V-Dem and the Observatory for Democracy and Governance at PUCP with qualitative insights from investigative journalism and participatory observation. The article contributes to the study of failed resistance movements by highlighting how these combined forms of autocratization constrain opposition actors in distinct ways.