Nozick, self-ownership, and the problem of self-enslavement

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick explicitly endorses what I call asymmetry about enslavement: It is impermissible to enslave another person, but it is permissible to enslave oneself. Later in life, Nozick expressed uncertainty about this position, stating that he had never been convinced by it but that he could not see how to avoid it. I argue that Nozick’s understanding of the inviolability of persons in Anarchy, State, and Utopia provides a clear and attractive avenue for embracing Nozickian self-ownership while affirming symmetry about enslavement, which states that it is not permissible to enslave any person, including oneself. This avenue turns on a distinction, which Nozick ignores, between historical self-creation and continuous self-creation: the Nozickian self-creation that grounds self-ownership is best understood as continuous, and the value of continuous self-creation supports symmetry about enslavement. Nevertheless, I do not believe that Nozickian self-ownership logically requires symmetry. Since asymmetry remains conceptually available, the Nozickian faces a fundamental choice about enslavement.