Children (and animals) in Nozick’s political philosophy

According to Susan Moller Okin, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism leads to a matriarchal dystopia: mothers own their children and may dispose of them as they please. This challenge rests on the claim that Nozick does not extend rights to infants. In this paper, to respond to Okin, we examine Nozick’s account of rights possession; explore Nozick’s work beyond Anarchy, State, and Utopia; and link children’s rights and animals’ rights. We propose three possible responses to Okin, grounded in Nozick’s own words. First, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their membership in the human species. Second, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their potentiality. Third, Nozick could grant rights to both infants and animals. We suggest that the third option is the most promising.