A Nozickian conception of liberty

The article introduces a conception of liberty that is inspired by Robert Nozick’s ‘presumption in favor of liberty.’ According to that conception, persons are unfree when and insofar as they are prevented from doing something that does not violate anyone’s rights. The article argues that this conception not only has more textual support in Anarchy, State, and Utopia than the one G.A. Cohen attributes to Nozick, but also that it has several theoretical advantages over it. More generally, it shows that it is an all-around plausible and attractive conception of liberty. It can correctly classify justly imprisoned persons as unfree to move around outside prison, it can explain why it classifies only some but not all just preventions as instances of unfreedom, it does not make the concept of liberty redundant, it is not tied to libertarianism in a problematic way, and it captures everything that is worth promoting and respecting about non-interference.