Incentive contract design for logistics enterprises to participate in online food safety regulation under government delegation: a study in the Chinese context

Online food consumption growth has increased cross-regional food safety risks, highlighting gaps in traditional localized governance. Incorporating logistics enterprises into the regulatory framework is seen as a viable solution to the challenges of supervising online food safety. However, due to their profit-driven nature, logistics enterprises are often reluctant to voluntarily assume regulatory responsibilities. To address this issue, this paper utilizes principal-agent theory to develop an incentive contract model between the government and logistics enterprises, aimed at ensuring effective participation in online food safety regulation. The model incentivizes logistics enterprises through three mechanisms: fixed base subsidies, reward and penalty incentives, and shared social benefits. The study examines the influence of key factors, such as incentive coefficients, on optimal decision-making. The results reveal that the effort level of logistics enterprises is affected by several factors, including fixed base subsidies, incentive coefficients, reward and penalty rates, and effort costs. The model identifies optimal incentive and reward-penalty coefficients, providing a foundation for establishing a contractual relationship that maximizes social welfare.