Can Higher-order Metaphysics Limit the Logical Space of Tense Realism?
Abstract
In a recent paper, Lukas Skiba argues that shifting to a higher-order metaphysical framework limits the logical space available to tense realists. In particular, he claims that Correia and Rosenkranz’s ‘dynamic absolutism’ cannot be restated in higher-orderist terms. I show that, although a higher-order version of dynamic absolutism indeed cannot be stated in the way Skiba contemplates, there are actually multiple different other ways in which it can.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Syntax
Semantics
Linguistic Variation
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Philosophic exchange
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33–43
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Language
- EN