How to Be a Constitutivist

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Authors: Bennett Eckert-Kuang
Cited by: 3
References: 42

Abstract

I defend pluralist metaethical constitutivism: Practical norms governing an agent are grounded in her kind of rational agency. Kinds of rational agency are defined in terms of reasons explanations: To be a given kind of rational agent is for one’s actions to admit of certain forms of reasons explanation. Unlike extant, “monist” constitutivists, pluralists need not say that there are constitutive standards of rational agency as such—just that there are constitutive standards of our kind of agency. They can thus admit the possibility of “minimal” agents whose agency cannot ground any norms, retaining monist constitutivism's virtues without its costs.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education Philosophical Ethics and Theory Marxism and Critical Theory

Publication details

Journal / source
Ethics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Volume
136
Issue
3
Pages
463–492
Publication date
23 March 2026
Language
EN