The New Chimera for Values in Science

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Authors: Arnon Levy, Jacob Stegenga
Cited by: 0
References: 42

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Abstract

Much of the literature on values in science is framed around the idea of a shift in the status of the so-called value-free ideal (VFI) for science: having been widely accepted in the past it has come to be thoroughly rejected. In turn, with the rejection of the VFI nearly status quo, a widely asserted view is that there is now a new problem for philosophy of science to address, namely, to distinguish appropriate value-influence on science from inappropriate value-influence. While we agree that understanding the many intricate ways that values can influence science is an important task for philosophy, we argue that this framing—that there is a single phenomenon to be understood, or a single problem to be solved—is misleading, and liable to distort inquiry. This framing creates a chimera.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation Logic and Philosophy of Science Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publication date
1 April 2026
Language
EN