Successful Crowd Control

Abstract This chapter offers a principled reply to the arguments from Chapter 8. The key idea is that though there may be a vast number of person-apt things in the near vicinity of every person, the person and his or her person-apt colleagues are directly aware of all the same things. This (combined with an independently plausible view of self-reference here called This Before I) assuages the epistemic worries. It is not the case that, other things being equal, I ought to believe that I am part of a larger conscious creature. And this (combined with independently plausible views about what makes suffering bad, and what makes events good or bad for a moral subject) assuages the practical worries. It is not the case that the suffering of large creatures is overwhelmingly more important than the suffering of small creatures, and not the case that I harm anything with moral status when I inflict temporary pain on a person for his or her long-term benefit.