Diachronic Emergence and the Collapse Problem

Abstract This chapter examines whether the collapse argument against the viability of synchronic emergence also applies to diachronic emergence. The collapse argument draws out a tension between the novelty of the emergent feature and the dependence of that feature on its base. The chapter begins by describing an inferential version of the collapse problem as applied to synchronic emergence. The problem is reframed in terms of dispositions, and it is shown that the synchronic novelty of an emergent property E possessed by an object O can always be undermined by postulating the existence of a disposition, possessed by a part of O, to generate E in the context of the other parts of O. Two different types of dispositions of this kind are examined, and it is argued that neither produces a collapse in the diachronic case. The chapter then proceeds to develop an enhanced collapse problem that applies both to synchronic and to diachronic emergence, and uses this to cast doubt on the safety of allowing so-called micro-latent dispositions in emergent contexts, not least because it permits dispositional properties that never manifest themselves due to the initial conditions of the universe not being suitable for activating them. To conclude, the chapter argues that at the heart of the collapse problem lies a conflict between reducibility and irreducibility and uses this to argue that a methodological approach to the problem is more suited than a metaphysical approach. The prospects for a clean solution along such lines are not, however, promising.