On the Notion of Diachronic Emergence

Abstract Is there a need for a distinctively diachronic conception of metaphysical emergence? This chapter argues to the contrary. In the main, its argumentative strategy consists in considering a representative sample of accounts of purportedly diachronic metaphysical emergence, and arguing that in each case, the purportedly diachronic emergence at issue either can (and should) be subsumed under a broadly synchronic account of metaphysical emergence, or else is better seen as simply a case of causation. More specifically, it is argued that emergence as a diachronic causal phenomenon (Mill, 1843; O’Connor and Wong, 2005) can be synchronically accommodated as involving emergent powers of a composite to produce the effects in question; that dynamic emergence (Humphreys, 2008; Mitchell, 2012) can be synchronically accommodated as involving cotemporal dependence on a temporally extended base; that fusion/transformational emergence (Humphreys, 1996, 2016) is plausibly just causation, subject to conditions standardly satisfied in cases of intra-level causation; and that ‘contextual’ emergence (Bishop et al., 2022) is plausibly just causation, where (as per usual) causes (or associated powers or dispositions) enter into producing effects only given the obtaining of relevant background conditions.