Against the Right Against Mental Interference

Abstract In this chapter, Douglas considers two objections to the claim that we possess the right against mental interference. Both of these maintain that the right is implausibly broad: it implies that some intuitively innocuous interventions are in fact morally wrongful. The first objection appeals to the extended mind thesis. It maintains that, if the extended mind thesis holds, the proponent of the right will be committed to holding, implausibly, that the right is infringed by interfering with the external objects in which our minds are partly realised. Douglas casts doubt on the intuitions invoked by this objection, but also argues that, even if the intuitions are veridical, the proponent of the right has responses available. Which response is most plausible depends on how extended the mind is. The second objection maintains that the proponent of the right against mental interference is committed to holding that some mundane and intuitively unproblematic mental influences, like wearing perfume on a date, infringe the right. Douglas concedes that there are some circumstances in which wearing perfume might infringe the right, but seeks to render this implication palatable by arguing that the right is a graded one—one that can be more or less seriously infringed—and by citing grounds for thinking that the infringement present in cases of wearing perfume would likely be at the less serious end of the spectrum.