Liminal Power Redefined

Abstract The Yoshida Doctrine is Japan’s well-known grand strategy post-World War II. As the US occupation of Japan ended in 1952 during the Cold War, the Japanese government focused on economic recovery and the pursuit of prosperity while minimizing its security commitment by hiding behind the US-imposed Constitution Article 9 and relying on the US military umbrella. Japan’s economic recovery proved miraculous, as the Cold War allowed Japan to access a large US market, and the two hot wars in Asia (Korea and Vietnam) from the 1950s through the 1970s boosted Japan’s exports. The chapter illustrates how the Yoshida Doctrine took shape in the context of heightened Cold War tensions at the time of China’s Communist victory in 1949 and under Japan’s entrapment concerns. Domestic political instability, in terms of both party politics and labor and student (leftist) movements, limited policy choices, and a dominant “anti-militarist” culture at the time constrained the voices of domestic veto players that supported military revival. Tokyo pursued its broader economic engagement as both its diplomatic strategy and its security policy. Although the Yoshida Doctrine was a successful grand strategy for Japan in achieving its economic goals, it was difficult for Japan to transform this strategy due to path-dependence, even when some leaders worked to push for the changes.