A Defence of Deflationism
Abstract
Abstract This chapter argues for passage deflationism, the view that individuals do not have experiences (as) of robust passage. In this chapter, matters are approached from a quite different angle. Given what is known about what people report about how things seem to them in experience, it argues that deflationism should be endorsed because it offers the best explanation of these reports. The chapter first presents empirical evidence regarding what that people report regarding their experiences. Then it offers a new IBE Argument to the conclusion that passage deflationism should be accepted because it is the best explanation of the variation found in people’s report about their experiences. The chapter then explains how the deflationist can explain this variation in reports.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Publication details
- Pages
- 56–87
- Publication date
- 12 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter