Our Temporal Concepts

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Authors: Kristie Miller
Cited by: 0
References: 144

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the Conceptual IBE Argument for robust passage, according to which it conceptually seems to us as though our world is dynamical. That is, people employ certain range of time-related concepts, including the concept of time itself, as well as the concepts of temporal passage, change, and persistence, in order to navigate the world, and that some or all of these concepts are ones that can only be satisfied if the world is dynamical. This chapter outlines several versions of the Conceptual IBE Argument depending on the time-related concept in question. It is then argued that people should reject the claim that the world conceptually seems to us to be dynamical. New empirical evidence about the nature of these concepts is then presented, which undermines the idea that people employ a range of time-related concepts that will only be satisfied if the world is dynamical.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Language Metaphor and Cognition

Publication details

Pages
105–121
Publication date
12 February 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book chapter