Making Things Real
Abstract
Abstract Chapter 1 outlines the core motivations and distinctive features of the view defended in the book. The chapter introduces three idiosyncrasies central to the book’s approach: (1) a rejection of the dominant focus on skepticism in moral epistemology in favor of constructing nonskeptical theories; (2) a prioritization of methods—like perception and imaginative engagement—that gives us direct access to the ethical and aesthetic facts; and (3) a parallel treatment of ethics and aesthetics, emphasizing their shared reliance on acquaintance and appreciation. The chapter contends that appreciating the normative facts requires acquaintance with particulars, not mere deference or abstract theorizing. The chapter sets the stage for a systematic defense of this view.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Aesthetics
and Art
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Pages
- 1–10
- Publication date
- 4 March 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter